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The Sight and Site of North Korea: Citizen Cartography’s Rhetoric of Resolution in the 
Satellite Imagery of Labor Camps 
By Timothy Barney 
ABSTRACT: In recent years, satellite mapping of North Korea, especially of its labor camps, 
has become important forms of evidence of human rights violations, used by transnational 
advocacy groups to lobby to Western governments for change. A phenomenon of “citizen 
cartography” has emerged where non-expert humanitarian actors use commercially available 
software like Google Earth to “infiltrate” the borders of North Korea. This essay interrogates 
the politics of seeing that takes place in creating the site and sight of North Korea by citizen 
cartographers, and historicizes these processes of seeing in Cold War and post-Cold War visual 
culture. Specifically, citizen cartography of North Korea engages in rhetorics of resolution, 
where the cartographer continually searches for a better, clearer view of the ground below, 
while still constrained by corporate software and logics of state sovereignty that make it difficult 
to "resolve" the problem of forced labor. 
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During a Senate hearing, on April 29, 2008, Senator Sam Brownback (R-Kansas) opened 
an address with a chilling story of an imprisoned family led into a glass room with a large metal 
injection tube, where a group of doctors stood outside taking notes. Soon, gas began to flow 
through the injection tube, infiltrating the room, and slowly killing each of the four family 
members. Brownback revealed to the audience that “The story I have just told you did not 
happen decades ago in Nazi Germany….This story happened to forgotten people in a forgotten 
part of a forgotten country….The place is called ‘Camp 22.’ It lies in the far northeastern corner 
of North Korea.”1 But as the scene in the Senate unfolded, it became clear that Brownback’s 
dramatic story was not just about the horrific crimes of a totalitarian regime and its prison 
system, it was also about the nature of “seeing” in the contemporary global landscape. The way 
in which these claims of human rights abuse are envisioned became a central character in the 
narrative. As Brownback noted to his audience, “commercially available satellite imagery allows 
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us to look upon Camp 22 for ourselves and verify what the survivors tell us in detail. Google 
Earth has made witnesses of us all. In these times, anyone with an Internet connection can look 
down into hell at Camp 22 and witness Holocaust Now.”2 Brownback sought to prove and 
defend the authenticity of his very methods of seeing, as he implicated his audience in the 
actions of the North Korean state and democratized the act of visualizing human rights abuses. 
Brownback invoked the satellite-enhanced map-photo hybrids into his address, while imploring 
his audience: “I want to show you Camp 22 today. I want you to see its fence lines, its gates, and 
moats. I want you to see the huts where its prisoners live, the coal mines where men are worked 
to death, and the forests and fields where the dead are discarded….Using Google Earth’s highest 
resolution, it is possible to trace the camp’s circumference perhaps hundreds of miles.”3 
It is important to note that Brownback procured his maps through a project called One 
Free Korea, a blog run by a Washington lawyer named Joshua Stanton [see Fig. 1].4 Other 
independent activists concurrently integrated Google Earth and other software into their work to 
expose clandestine North Korean actions, most notably the researcher Curtis Melvin, who works 
for Johns Hopkins US-Korea Institute, runs the North Korea Economy Watch website, and has 
contributed to the 38 North Digital Atlas.5 The Wall Street Journal has referred to such activists 
as “citizen spies,” Melvin has referred to his work as “democratized intelligence,” while Stanton 
has referred to these kinds of crowd-sourcing mappers, more colloquially, as “amateur squints.”6 
Perhaps the label that has stuck the most, though, and which Google itself has used, is “citizen 
cartographers.”7  
 “Citizen cartography” is a complex and fraught phenomenon that is part of a broader 
transformation of visual culture, informed by the history of aerial visualization and cartography, 
which changes the ways we frame humanitarianism and human rights.8 A corporate software 
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program can now create “witnesses” of transnational human rights violations, with a 
cartographic interface that permits us to transcend the sovereign borders of a state such as North 
Korea and see clearly what is happening below. By labeling these Google Earth (and other 
geospatial software) users citizen cartographers, a certain status is transferred to them that 
invokes citizenship in the sense of political participation, civic duty, and deliberation. Watching 
North Korea becomes a rite of the good citizen. Just merely labeling North Korea a “forgotten 
country,” as Brownback did, while showing state-of-the-art satellite mapping, begs for that 
nation to become a space of Western humanitarian surveillance. The idea that a citizen can quite 
literally put North Korea back on the map is a profound political act. The label of cartographer is 
also important, as it takes the power of visualization of space away from professional scientists 
and places it in the hands of “anyone with a computer.” A 2013 Atlantic article asked in its 
headline, “What Happens When Everyone Makes Maps?”—and this kind of question points to 
the complications that the democratization and simultaneous screening of citizenship has brought 
amidst a stream of ever-present geospatial intelligence.9  
Recent scholarship has begun to explore what it means to bring the “citizen” and the 
“cartographer” together.10 Work by critical cartographers and geographers has especially focused 
on the consequences of mapping in an era of Web 2.0 tools that allow the work of everyday 
people to sketch, in latitude and longitude, areas shrouded by state-sanctioned secrecy or plagued 
by human rights injustices. This literature hangs on a contention between the hope that such 
technology brings to truly revolutionize the citizen’s role in revealing geopolitical crises and 
challenging the state to act on them, and the fear that these tools are simply reiterating the pitfalls 
of the imperial histories of cartography but now through non-experts. Several researchers in the 
field of rhetorical studies have taken up cartography, satellite imagery, and aerial visualization 
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more broadly, as rhetorical phenomena bound up in an ever-evolving narrative of scientific 
progress that often hides a more contentious history of militarized and humanitarian visions of 
the so-called developing world.11  
The case of North Korean labor camp mapping, and the discourse around that mapping, is 
an important representative example of these contributions, but also an extension of them. 
Specifically, the North Korea case operates through a concept that is perhaps the most revealing 
that Senator Brownback used in his presentation: resolution. I define resolution as a critical lens 
by which to examine the discourse of cartography and aerial/satellite photography, and I invoke 
both its technical and rhetorical meanings. Resolution, on one hand, is a technical cartographic 
term that notes the ever-increasing capacity to get better clarity in viewing the ground below, 
recognizing that resolution lessens as we try to get closer to seeing the features of the landscape. 
On the other hand, I argue that a rhetorical notion of resolution recognizes that cartography and 
aerial/satellite imagery are part of a long historical narrative of ever-increasing clarity, and that 
with such clarity comes an expectation that one can somehow resolve geopolitical problems. The 
widening scope and increased precision of cartographic and aerial technologies has been 
accompanied by a sense that we can change the world below us through our enhanced vision. 
The accumulation of more and better digital information presents itself as deliberation—the 
resolution keeps getting better, thus is our perceived ability to resolve humanitarian and military 
problems strengthened. Web 2.0 cartographic technology, and its endorsers like Brownback, 
promote resolution as a way to clear up our blurred vision of North Korea and specifically its 
human rights abuses. In a way, this makes the deepening and sharpening of pixels in envisioning 
satellite images of camps somehow equated with helping correct the problem of forced labor, 
sparking that perennial debate around whether spectatorship, however active it may seem, can be 
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action.12 By framing this essay around a specifically rhetorical notion of resolution, I seek to add 
a productive vocabulary to the discussion of how citizens, corporations, and the state position 
themselves in a visual culture, one that is both new and beholden to age-old conceptions of maps 
and the all-powerful view from above. Senator Brownback’s emphatic “I want you to see…” is 
more than just an appeal to look at some pictures to accompany speech, it is an invitation to 
become implicated in this visual culture of seeing from privileged perspectives in a landscape of 
international human rights and increasingly militant views of North Korea.  
To situate the mapping of North Korean labor camps and its accompanying discourse as 
embedded in a rhetorical history of resolution, I place resolution and the phenomenon of citizen 
cartography within the important discussions that critical cartographers, geographers, 
rhetoricians, and others are now sharing about maps and aerial visualization. Then, I make the 
three main moves of the essay: I explore resolution as an underlying ideology within the 
rhetorical history of twentieth-century visual culture and within the profound shifts to a new 
geographic imagination in the twenty-first century; I analyze particular citizen maps of North 
Korea as well as their surrounding discourses to demonstrate how a rhetoric of resolution 
positions citizen cartographers as detached, data-centered humanitarians through digital 
interfaces; and I examine several examples of the circulation of the North Korea maps to show 
the complex corporate and state visions that affect the ways users receive these images, and how 
resolution complicates such circulation. I bring these moves together to make the argument that 
citizen cartography is marked by the rhetorical history of maps and aerial visualization 
themselves, and the ways both have come to classify, order, and transform political and social 
space. Such a rhetorical history reveals a powerful but problematic narrative of resolution that 
emphasizes synoptic vision, democratic progress, and claims to truth. 
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Defining “Resolution” and “Citizen Cartography” in the North Korean Context 
A host of interdisciplinary scholars has encouraged a truly rhetorical history of citizen 
cartography, aerial visualization, and satellite imagery, while also keeping in mind the cultural 
and economic aspects of the tensions between citizens, the state, and technology corporations. I 
offer “resolution” as a way to unite some of these various strands of literature: there is an 
increasing technical sophistication in digital and mapping technology that prizes the resolution of 
seeing the ground below more clearly, which then correlates to a seeming ability for the citizen 
to participate actively in the resolution of geopolitical crises.  
Esri (the Environmental Systems Research Institute), one of the corporate firms that 
provides software for citizen cartographers, defines resolution in its online glossary in technical 
terms as “the detail with which a map depicts the location and shape of geographic features. The 
larger the map scale the higher the possible resolution. As scale decreases, resolution diminishes 
and feature boundaries must be smoothed, simplified, or not shown at all; for example, small 
areas may have to be represented as points.”13 In looking at a North Korean labor camp through a 
satellite map, only the outlines of features can be discerned because the resolution diminishes as 
we try to zoom in, and thus we rely on citizen cartographers to interpret those outlines for us. A 
rhetorical lens of resolution interrogates the notion that our seeing shapes our actions—the 
greater the resolution that a map can provide us, the greater resolve we feel we have in 
understanding and then acting on the problems and conflicts the map frames. This relationship 
between vision and action is both complex and problematic. One problem is that the telos of 
resolution is never-ending—using a screen or a map or a photo is to always be mediated; one can 
never get full resolution. We can never get ourselves inside the camp. But that fact has not 
stopped the power of its narrative: if we can just see more clearly and with greater resolution, we 
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think we will have a better handle on geopolitical issues like forced labor, and maybe even 
control them.  
Traditionally, the state (especially the military) informed how we saw the world and at 
what resolution we would see it, and so much of that could be censored or classified. 
Cartographic historian J.B. Harley’s pioneering work in historicizing this phenomenon in early 
modernity is typically the starting point in much of this literature.14 His theorization of the ability 
of maps to abstract space into clean, inert surfaces for state intervention has also driven other 
important works by critical cartographers like Jeremy W. Crampton, Denis Wood, and John 
Pickles.15 In these works, cartography is a rhetoric of imperial power and state control through 
spatial abstraction of the ground below. The state, however, is not the only source of our 
cartographic vision: historians like Susan Schulten have shown how the state, scientific 
institutions, and popular media share in the creation of a geographic imagination—a reminder 
that cartography is as much a rhetorical practice with multiple producers and audiences as it is an 
exercise of top-down control by the state.16 What’s more is that the lines between what is state 
cartography and what is not are often blurry. Geographer Craig Dalton, for example, has offered 
an illuminating history of how services like Google Earth and Google Maps have their roots in 
Cold War state and military applications but are also driven by new twenty-first century 
corporate interests.  
The discourse of citizen cartography often champions the ability of everyday people to 
crowd-source spatial information in ways that the state and corporations cannot do alone, but as 
scholars have pointed out, this can obscure the knotty history of states and corporations in 
providing the platform for these citizens. Geographer Sebastien Caquard has noted that “just as 
the specific interests of the nation state have largely shaped the reality produced by paper maps 
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throughout the centuries, the recent convergence of interests between high-tech private 
companies and a small group of technologically savvy individuals is now shaping the reality 
produced through geosocial media. In this sense, many collective mapping projects in the social 
media era can be seen as contributing to the reworking of existing power structures, rather than 
truly resisting them.”17 Corporations like Google and Esri allow engaged citizens to see both 
more widely and more deeply, giving them the power to zoom in and out with ease—but all the 
while promoting the viability of their own products. As Dalton puts it, “Google found a way to 
appropriate the technical innovation of state programs and the playfulness of hackers and apply 
them to the company’s business strategy of popular, individualized consumption and 
advertising.”18 The potential consequence is that citizens believe they have control over 
resolution, even while relying on a corporate mode of seeing to try and resolve geopolitical 
problems.   
Because of this, citizenship itself is both challenged and transformed by digital 
mapping’s narratives of resolution—calling into question what kind of authority and expertise 
the everyday citizen has to create maps and interpret satellite images. Martin Dodge and Rob 
Kitchin employ sociologist George Ritzer’s theory of “prosumption” to advance the idea that the 
citizen is both producer and consumer of digital maps.19 In this theory, citizens are creating their 
own maps with a certain sense of agency and often for progressive, humanitarian purposes, but 
they do so within a context of providing free labor to geosoftware corporations to help develop 
and market their products. On one hand, the crowdsourcing opportunities in citizen cartography 
offer productive “challenges to the professional authorship and normative ontology of 
cartographic representations and their supposed fixity, objectivity, and authority.”20 Scholars, for 
example, have noted numerous successes that citizen cartography has enjoyed in democratizing 
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knowledge and drawing awareness to geopolitical crises in Darfur, Burma, and Argentina.21 And 
yet at the same time, as Dodge and Kitchin continue, “despite the rhetoric of mass involvement,” 
citizen cartography is more often “crowdsourced by a few and not the many, with only a small 
active group who are setting the ontology and doing much of the mapping labour.”22 In the North 
Korea case for example, some of the most prominent citizen cartography of that nation and its 
labor camps is done by lawyers like Stanton and academics like Melvin—they may not be 
cartographic experts per se, but there is certainly a sense that they have access to elite 
knowledges and tools that the everyday citizen does not have. At stake in the relationship 
between states, corporations, and citizens here is the very ownership of cartographic knowledge 
and who gets to determine the sense of resolution in the Web 2.0 era  
Finally, if the terms of state power, corporate ownership, and citizenship are challenged 
by digital cartography, then so is the nature of vision and visual culture itself. A rhetorical 
perspective on resolution situates this vision both in a critical history and in an ideological 
understanding of “seeing” from a Western vantage point. 23 Rhetorician Joshua Ewalt has 
invoked this kind of history, writing that satellite cartography “brings with it a politicized, 
militarist, and capitalistic history that produces the subject behind the computer screen as 
simultaneously a citizen war-consumer and one who has the power of the digital divide to 
embody the viewing position of the colonizer in advanced capitalism.”24 That powerful position 
is not just historically rooted, but ideologically rooted as well—an important part of 
understanding how “resolution” works rhetorically. In this vein, scholars like Joshua Reeves and 
Marouf Hasian have considered how the gaze of a citizen-subject can be both empowered and 
disempowered by digital media, and remind us that a business like citizen cartography in the 
Web 2.0 age often relies on the eyes of Western humanitarian citizens surveying distant places 
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from abstract positions.25 Such contributions accentuate that humanitarian vision, and the 
expectation that we can resolve global problems by having greater resolution, is often anchored 
in specifically Western forms of seeing. Roger Stahl’s larger project about the militarization of 
digital life also gets at these very practices, particularly in terms of complicating how we “see” 
the exercise of citizenship. Stahl claims that “The weaponization of the gaze…worked to 
captivate, capture, and colonize the citizen while submerging the deliberative impulse. The irony, 
of course, is that in purporting to bring the citizen closer to the action, the weaponized aesthetic 
worked to distance the citizen from political participation in matters of actual military power.”26 
Stahl’s “weaponized gaze” asks us to consider whether citizens are truly deliberating through 
digital mapping and satellite platforms, or merely reifying state and corporate power, traditional 
narratives of resolution, and surveillance. 
The digital mapping of North Korea specifically affirms this long history of how citizens 
are implicated in state and (increasingly) corporate narratives of resolution, and how their vision 
is ideologically rooted. It seems important to remember that the cartography of North Korean 
human rights abuses is not an emancipatory case of indigenous mapping where citizen 
cartographers in North Korea are appropriating technology to highlight the need for social 
change. Instead, the North Korean mapping reveals the practices of the Western eye watching a 
shrouded culture from outside and above, a culture with little agency to “map back,” and the use 
of the finger and the eye (enhanced by digital technology) to create an abstract map that then 
circulates as evidence that we are ever vigilant over world spaces.  
Resolution Narratives of Aerial Visualization, Cartography, and Visual Culture 
 
J.B. Harley wrote that through maps “We can glimpse…the unconscious process of 
myth-making, through which the invention of a progressive positivist past is used to justify a 
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progressive positivist present.”27 Resolution is a mythic discourse that sees mapping as marching 
ever forward and upward as a continually clearer, more detached, and more universal way of 
analyzing geopolitical crises on the ground below. Such resolution often obscures a contentious 
rhetorical history of cartography that is wrapped in both militaristic and humanitarian motives 
emergent in the “view from above.”  
The ascent of aerial visualization is particularly important to contextualizing the North 
Korea case. Caren Kaplan’s Aerial Aftermaths: Wartime From Above offers an account of the 
view from hot-air balloons and panoramic photography through satellites all the way to drones, 
pointing out that “Both human flight and photography along with cartography made possible 
new dynamic interplays between ‘seen’ and ‘unseen’ elements, establishing the ambiguities of 
aerial observation while intensifying the links between these practices and the waging of war.”28 
World War I, of course, represents a milestone merger between the view from above (and its 
attendant valorization of technological progress through the airplane and photography) with the 
business of warfare. And while early WWI-era air proselytizers like General Billy Mitchell 
reveled in the progressive narrative that the air offered a “much clearer impression of how the 
armies were laid out than any amount of traveling on the ground,” the sense of what is “unseen” 
becomes just as important (and haunting).29 As Kaplan writes, “If Mitchell’s ‘clear impression’ 
of the details of the ground did not include the bodies half-buried in trenches or blown to pieces 
in ‘no man’s land,’ the analog aerial photograph held the information, nonetheless, as unseen, a 
present absence.”30 That sanitization of lived experience on the ground increasingly accompanied 
the rise of aerial visualization and its discourse: today, the digital cartography of North Korea 
emphasizes, at much higher resolutions, the structures and layouts of labor camps, while leaving 
the actual bodies of prisoners unseen. This is an important reminder that rhetorics of resolution in 
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maps have always operated by revelation and concealment, choosing for the viewer what should 
be clear and visible. 
Global war further heightened the need for abstraction and synopsis of the ground below. 
The so-called “air-age global” maps of the era preceding World War II and during the war itself, 
especially in newspapers and magazines, re-created the high-flying feeling of looking over the 
territory as if it was unfolding in front of the viewer.31 Particularly novel choices in map 
projection, and bird’s eye view perspectives, made possible by aerial photographs taken by 
increasingly sophisticated cameras on planes, allowed spectators at home to simulate the nature 
of the earth as a spinning globe on the flat page and mimicked a kind of deliberative participation 
alongside state leaders in the strategy of war. Much like their digital antecedents in the Google 
Earth era, these WWII maps rendered the surfaces of the world as strategic spaces. That kind of 
abstraction allowed one to objectively and soberly consider the strategic facts of a global war—
again, the sense that greater technical resolution equaled greater control. Certainly, these changes 
in maps accompanied the rise of the synoptic view of government that FDR persuaded the 
country to take on, as Mary E. Stuckey has argued.32 This is after all the same president who 
asked citizens to “look at your map” during a fireside chat as they seemingly were allowed in to 
the usually shrouded spaces of war strategy.33 At the time, vision was a central part of the appeal 
to keeping a beleaguered democratic state together, and the increasingly popular views from the 
air supplemented that rhetorical vision.  
These cartographic visions also became important state weapons, both in public fora and 
in classified contexts. For example, the collaborative propaganda effort between the American 
Federation of Labor, the Department of State, and the early CIA that produced the “Gulag—
Slavery, Inc.” map (1951) was one important precursor of the North Korean citizen maps.34 
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“Gulag—Slavery, Inc.” used cartography and photography of camp survivors in a multi-
mediated display of the labor prison system in the Soviet Union, marking an important 
infiltration of shrouded Soviet borders with the power of place. To be able to label a camp with 
precision marked the map’s function as an important evidentiary weapon in the Cold War, and 
also allowed the concrete suffering of bodies concealed in the map to be abstracted into an 
ideological argument against Soviet values and ideas. In the process, the map became part of 
what historian Susan L. Carruthers has called “the transatlantic politics of knowledge.”35 This 
was also on display when Cold War actors such as Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and Adlai Stevenson 
marshaled satellite maps as weapons for the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations’ public 
campaigns against the Soviet Union.36 The North Korea maps update these tensions for a post-
Cold War landscape, as they allow for a very simple but powerful labeling and valorizing of the 
knowledge of the unknown—the awe of that ability to cross and penetrate borders not with tanks 
or planes, but with satellite cameras.  
The North Korea case can also be traced to the Cold War push towards cartographic 
digitization, which, as John Cloud and others have detailed, was rooted in the world of classified 
defense.37 GIS initiatives, for example, come out of the black boxes of satellite and aerial 
photography in post-WWII military-industrial-academic collaboration.38 The Eisenhower 
administration, in particular, saw significant federal investment in the construction of 
reconnaissance satellites, including the “Eye in the Sky” of the CIA-funded CORONA project.39 
As Monica Brannon notes, “Reconnaissance satellites further united the mechanical and political 
achievements of undetected space flight with a particular way of viewing spaces that required 
seeing as relational, scaled, automated, and from a nonhuman perspective.”40 In the process, the 
dawn of the age of “Big Data,” which was reliant on the new locational and satellite 
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technologies, created a kind of ocularcentrism where “meaningful knowledge” was equated with 
“a top-down perspective.”41 Mapping was thus increasingly associated with that dual-notion of 
resolution—that maps would be experienced through always-improving pixels, while also laying 
out space in such a way that problems could seemingly be more easily solvable.  
Concurrent with the growth of satellite technologies during the Cold War was the rise of 
the technocrat, and with it an ever more synoptic, bigger picture vision of the earth and a 
conception of seeing as knowing.42 The ability to see, in one glance, volumes of complex data 
was equated with how secure the United States was perceived to be. Orit Halpern has written of 
post-war Big Data how “data visualization became a democratic virtue and moral good; reason 
was now understood as algorithmic, rule-bound, definitive, and fast.”43 For example, the 
equation of moral good and technocracy was certainly demonstrated in the cartographic 
treatment of the “Third World” in the collective Cold War imagination, of which North Korea 
was a part. Visualization through maps became a central part of seeing what needed to be 
developed, both to strengthen national interests and security while altruistically helping humanity 
to rationally see things more clearly.44 Resolution was, once again, always the goal—to see our 
enemies and our allies in increasingly clearer vision alongside an impulse for stronger control of 
the ground below; militarism and humanitarianism were united on the map. 
Cold War collective memory still haunts the citizen-produced labor camp maps today.45 
As Christine Hong writes, “the irresolution of war between North Korea and the United States 
has fostered a speculative intelligence industry,” in which the American geographic imagination 
of North Korea is constituted by a habit of trying to “look behind”: enveloped in a kind of iron 
curtain, punctuated by evidentiary peeks into the mystery.46 Stephen J. Hartnett has pointed out 
that there remains a kind of belligerent humanitarianism after the Cold War that assumes, a la 
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Hillary Clinton, that there is an “information curtain” that has been drawn around places like 
China and North Korea.47 That transformation from an iron curtain to an information curtain is 
an important visual and discursive shift that takes place because it casts an area like North Korea 
as being able to be “saved” through greater resolution in the accumulation of more knowledge 
and a better, clearer vision. 
The resolution of North Korea on the map is constituted by the twinned histories of 
militarism and humanitarianism that arose out of the twentieth century. Roger Stahl suggests that 
“Rather than say that the 3D satellite image has been ‘demilitarized’ as it has entered civilian 
life, it may be more accurate to say that the transference has draped the planet with a militarized 
image of itself.”48 While Stahl rightfully sees militarized citizens (“desktop generals”) at the 
controls of digital mapping software, I would also argue that these satellite maps likewise create 
a humanitarian gaze that is bound up with the militarized gaze—that the impulse to both help 
North Koreans and protect against them comes from the same context and often the same 
media.49 Some of the most recent manifestations of these tensions, for example have been seen 
through “humanitarian drones”—unmanned aerial vehicles and other technologies that target 
particular areas for aid deliver and gather surveillance around hotspots for global humanitarian 
intervention. This phenomenon is perhaps the apotheosis of the twinned history of militarism and 
humanitarianism in modern visual culture brought about by the view from the air. While this 
article focuses on the citizen cartographic surveillance of human rights issues in places like 
North Korea, it is worth noting that these drones draw on the same impulses of security/aid and 
the same kind of vision. As Kristin Bergtora Sandvik and Kjersti Lohne have written, the drones 
bring about questions “about the causal relationship between knowledge of suffering and 
political action….Surveillance drones can potentially serve as a ‘technology of witnessing’—
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providing accurate, real-time information about atrocities….Yet, as is already evident from the 
history of humanitarian (in)action, there is no necessary link between knowing about human 
rights violations and responding to them.”50 The kind of questions about the distance and vision 
of drones also need to be asked about satellite maps made from corporate software.51 These shifts 
of vision are reminders that the new maps of North Korea did not just spring from an ingenious 
piece of software—the impulses behind these maps are part of a complicated arc that 
encompasses a long history of looking from the air for a greater resolution, one that is always 
still working itself out.  
The Placement of the Citizen in Digital Maps of North Korea 
With geospatial technology, the citizen cartographer becomes a remote activist who is 
engaged and immersed on one hand, and detached and all-knowing on the other. This is the 
essential tension of resolution narratives: the omniscient, technological viewpoint somehow 
allows us to become progressive, engaged activists. The implications of that tension are explored 
in this section by putting the North Korean maps themselves in conversation with their 
surrounding discourse—resolution discourses that promote the technology and the surveillant 
gaze itself as ever-evolving, but often complicate the ability to actually resolve the problem of 
North Korean forced labor. 
 The very first public maps of the North Korean labor camps appeared as a series of 
satellite photographs in the Far Eastern Economic Review in an article by their correspondent, 
John Larkin.52 Larkin wrote:  
No foreigners have ever seen the North Korean camps. They’re hidden away in rugged 
mountains, camouflaged from prying eyes on the ground and in the air. Satellite imagery 
of the camps that intelligence services in South Korea and the United States are believed 
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to possess has not been released. With no physical evidence to refute North Korea’s 
denials that these camps exist, the testimony of defectors has largely failed to lift the veil 
of mystery enveloping them….Until now. The Review has obtained satellite photos of 
one of the biggest slave camps, nestled in the mountains of North Korea’s rugged far 
northeastern frontier with China.53  
Vision is put at a premium here, as “prying eyes” become a way of liberating the camps from an 
information curtain (but stop short of materially liberating the camps). Larkin notes that the state 
may possess such maps, but they have chosen to keep them classified for security purposes, and 
so he makes a point that it is left up to other groups, like citizen cartographers, to bring them to 
the discerning public. Thus, the work of the citizen cartographer is elevated to an important, 
authentic truth-telling status that provides something beyond what the state is willing to.54  
Larkin’s work is also careful to mix the satellite maps with corroborating reports from 
former camp guards, as once again the focus on authenticity is central. Maps have to engage in 
consent with the viewer that they are in fact a map, and with that status comes an aura of 
reliability, precision, and correspondence to truth. This process of consensus is especially 
important with the North Korean maps because ostensibly they are satellite photos that are 
overwritten with the familiar qualities of maps: icons (or postings), text, and a basic spatial 
network. The user has to accept the map as offering something beyond an aerial photograph, and 
thus a system of cartographic inscription takes place over the satellite image. Larkin’s maps are 
simple aerial perspectives of a vast network below—Camp 22, for example, comprises 16 
compounds, from theatres to propaganda bureaus to “detention and torture centres.” In stark 
black and white, numbered buttons correspond to the names of each facility, with the 
compounding caption “No. 22 Camp HQ: Prisoners transferred to its feared detention centre 
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rarely survive.” The drama of the caption contrasts with the fuzzy details of the camp on the 
photo/map—viewers have no idea what they are looking at until they are assured by Larkin and 
Digital Globe.55 Once again, a map traffics in that exchange of trust, and the “reality” of North 
Korean human rights violations emerges through a rhetoric of resolution in the belief that we can 
always get a better, clearer view. 
At the same time, this potentially focuses these North Korea maps on the methods and 
form rather than the content and message. Shortly after Larkin’s maps caused a stir, the first draft 
of the comprehensive and influential Hidden Gulag report on North Korea by the DC-based 
Committee for Human Rights in North Korea appeared in 2003, which comprised a dynamic 
group of think-tank and university academics, foreign policy professionals, human rights 
lawyers, and NGO administrators.56 In the second edition of this report (2012), the authors prize 
the idea of authenticity and highlight their painstaking methods as a key part of their credibility 
as North Korean human rights authorities, making overtures to the idea of resolution, as they 
write:  
The satellite photography of the camps used in the first edition was provided by two 
private companies that specialize in commercial satellite photos, Digital Globe and the 
Space Imaging Corporation. Obtaining the photographs and inputting the citations and 
designations by the former prisoners into the satellite photographs was a laborious and 
time consuming process. The Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) 
obtained very detailed maps of North Korea that included degrees of latitude and 
longitude. The maps were airmailed to our local NGO partners in Seoul, who called the 
former prisoners into their offices and showed them the maps. If and when the former 
prisoners could locate the camps at which they were held, the degrees of latitude and 
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longitude were plotted. We then contacted the two satellite photo firms to see if they had 
any imagery for those coordinates in their database. If so, we would order detailed 
satellite images for those coordinates….By the time of the research for the second 
edition, Google Earth made satellite images, often of much higher resolution, of the entire 
Korean peninsula available to anyone with a computer and Internet connection. Using the 
coordinates from the first edition of Hidden Gulag, Korea specialists pored over the 
higher resolution images of the camps, identifying the fences and guard towers that 
demarcate the prison camp boundaries. Google Earth enables pinpointing landmarks with 
efficiency.57  
This supporting discourse for the maps positions the very process of mapping as one marked by 
painstaking methods that actually perform authenticity and precision through higher and higher 
resolution “with efficiency.” Also, the use and mention of the prisoner here in the Hidden Gulag 
report is done in an almost ironic way—the flesh-and-blood sufferer of state oppression is used 
here as part of the cartographic methods and collaboration with the citizen cartographers, as the 
prisoner becomes a kind of just another consultant and expert. In a sense, the prisoners become a 
kind of cybernetic arm for the mappers and their grueling experience gets digitized into code. 
This passage is, thus, a fitting encapsulation of the narrative of resolution: citizen cartographers 
and human rights experts filter, with progressively improving technology, the affective and 
emotional experiences of real prisoners into a clean, clear, and efficient user experience in trying 
to “envision” and map human rights violations in North Korea. 
Despite the fact that the maps are created out of verified human experience, the irony of 
never having perfect resolution is that the maps end up, necessarily, scrubbing out human 
experience and focusing on structures.58 The Google Earth-produced (and other geospatial 
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technology companies) satellite images of North Korea reveal empty buildings and enclosures in 
sharp contrast with wide-open areas. For example, entering the word “camp” into the 38 North 
Digital Atlas, powered by Esri software, pulls up what are termed “incarceration facilities,” 
including one labeled “School for children born in camp” and another one labeled, “Jamsang-ri 
(Gulag)” [see Fig. 2].59 The label’s choice, in some ways, harkens back to the “Gulag—Slavery, 
Inc.” map of the early 1950s, where photographs of emaciated children’s bodies are depicted 
alongside the cartographic postings, the dots, where each of the Soviet gulag camps is located.60 
While we do not see photographs of camp children on the 38 North images, only blurred-out 
satellite images of the structures, the logic of entering seemingly innocent people into the map’s 
advocacy is similar.  
The choice to show these on the maps constructs the camps as a system, almost its own 
inner society, not as a set of makeshift, temporary prisons unconnected to one another. As 
Christine Hong has written, because of “the dark art of North Korea watching, hazy mirroring 
surfaces, in this case, defector accounts and amateur satellite maps, reinforced each other as 
seemingly autonomous images—a recursive synergy that then crystallized into the solidity and 
clarity of received truth. In the process, a Google Earth image of an obscure location emerged 
definitively as ‘Camp 25.’”61 This translation process invokes the age-old power of cartography 
to label, classify, and, most importantly, order space. One particular image on Curtis Melvin’s 
North Korean Economy Watch blog, for example, is a master map [see Fig. 3] containing all of 
the crowd-sourced place names of North Korea aggregated together, including its prisons, into an 
overwhelming panorama. Individual places are difficult to read because there are so many 
superimposed on each other—the only useful employment of the map could be to impress the 
viewer with the strength and health of democratized intelligence.62 The map reminds the  
 21 
viewer just how much work from a vast network of citizen cartographers went into the display. 
The challenge, of course, is that this supposed high-resolution interactive map obscures the 
actual North Koreans below, who cannot look back at the satellites, cameras, and citizen 
cartographers who are surveying them from afar. 
Thus what is not shown on these maps is just as important as what is shown: the very 
body-less nature of the maps is one of geospatial technology’s hallmarks. The presence of bodies 
might signal an uneasy contentiousness and sense of partiality; without the bodies, users are able 
to indulge in a spatial fantasy of objectivity.63 As noted by cartographic theorists Chris Perkins 
and Martin Dodge, “Connotations of a naturalistic objectivity and transparency flow from the use 
of these visual technologies: the aesthetic of abstraction and remoteness connotes the image as a 
document of truth, and hides the political work the image is employed to achieve.”64 The camp 
can be read as a clean, abstract space, as just one of a series of postings on the map. The camp 
can then be easily aggregated and quantified as “evidence.” Benjamin Bratton uses Google Earth 
as an example, which he says promotes “a blank, purified vision of a planet somehow 
constructed as an objective integrated context onto and into which history might work, and 
simultaneously agnostic as to how anything arrives in its place or why.”65 The software is 
removed from its own formal histories and the histories of the content that it represents. Thus, 
users cannot escape the issue of a map’s age-old struggle to manage the concrete and abstract, 
particularly acute here in a situation connected to human rights abuses. Brannon, once again, 
puts this well, as she writes of geospatial technologies like Google Earth, “instead of seeing the 
difference among spaces and places, the uniqueness of individuals and diversity of experience, 
there is a relational sameness that is prioritized, standardizing space as algorithmic patterns.”66 
What users see is not North Korea, then, but a constructed space of strategy, the world reduced 
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to a cartographic surface to be acted on at some point in the future, always in the future. The 
cleanliness of the image allows for the resolution of the problem of detention in North Korea to 
become suddenly clearer. 
In the process, users tend to believe that they have the freedom of movement in programs 
like Google Earth to swoop in from above from bird’s-eye view perspectives right into the 
granular detail of the space itself, immersing ourselves in the progressive nature of the 
technology. Google Earth, through this sense of movement, often belies the fact that it comprises 
a mosaic of static aerial photographs. For Farman, in Google Earth “the satellite or aerial 
photograph serves as an index of a specific moment in time and a representation of that 
ontological materiality captured by the photographic technology.”67 That sense of three-
dimensional immersion and movement, though, is an illusion: the software is built on a series of 
flat satellite photographs. Sybille Lammes writes, “The range of views and the degree of 
zooming and moving have increased spectacularly in the case of Google Earth, but as a tool and 
toy it still depends heavily on reproducible inscriptions.”68 Google purchased the digital mapping 
service, Keyhole Corp. in 2004, and wove together the images of Keyhole’s satellite database 
into something seemingly seamless. According to Gordon, “This feature provided users with a 
clearer sense of the immutability of territory. As data in Google’s new software were distinctly 
fluid, its relationship to territory was unfaltering—an impression enforced by the ‘you-are-here’ 
feature of satellite images.”69 This tension between detachability from particular places and 
intense attachment to other places constitutes the rhetoric of resolution in the digital map. 
This simulated freedom to move also raises questions about how truly interactive these 
maps are. So much of the work displayed in technologies like Google Earth, including the North 
Korea maps, is fashioned and constructed to make it appear as if we are in control of what we 
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see—that the resolution is in our hands. At the same time, the very simplicity of the interface in 
its ability to create that seeming control is a rhetorical gesture. In an interview with geographer 
Jeremy W. Crampton, Avi Bar-Zeev, co-founder of Google Earth and Keyhole, remarked that, 
“GE was designed to work like a physical globe on steroids (in a good way). With a physical 
globe, you can grab it, spin it, and so on, all in a very natural, intuitive manner. You don’t need 
to form complex queries to see interesting and useful visual results in GE. That kind of 
complexity comes pre-digested for you, for better or worse. And that pre-digestion also makes 
the system much more nimble in terms of performance, which goes back to ease of use and the 
basic ‘wow’ factor.”70 Citizens are made to feel as if their inquiries into Google Earth are free 
and unfettered, but they are, of course, bound up in corporate and technical choices made by 
engineers and marketers. With Bar-Zeev’s comment, we are reminded that the “wow factor” is 
one of the hallmarks of Google Earth—the form of the technology is as central to the experience 
as the content it displays. In the North Korea case, this factor asks if we are overly impressed by 
our own abilities—and interrogates whether our agency in a digital social change situation is 
exaggerated. As Brannon writes, “reducing complexity through a ‘pre-digested’ product limits a 
critical awareness from the public and strengthens false notions of ‘real’ objective mechanical 
production of an image.”71 The visual rhetoric of the North Korea images is caught in a tension 
between a map’s ability to present and frame data that can be used for social change, while still 
always remaining a tool of social control. 
The Corporate Lens and North Korean Maps 
 Resolution is also profoundly affected by who, or what, provides the access to that vision. 
As noted earlier, resolution in mapping has often been a function of the state—it powerfully 
controlled the ways the world was classified and envisioned, at what scope, scale, and vantage 
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point that it chose. And, therefore, the state was largely seen as the institution that could 
“resolve” problems. Recently, however, the declassification of GIS and GPS technologies from 
their military roots led to the proliferation of powerful corporate forms of resolution, which as 
Brownback illustrates, now even direct state forms of vision. Corporate forms of cartographic 
vision are not new—think of the prominence of firms like National Geographic in producing the 
twentieth-century geographic imagination—but what is new is the seeming autonomy and ease 
that corporations give users.72 The very public goals of such citizens to agitate against human 
rights violations are met by the potentially conflicting goals of private companies. The eventful 
circulation of the new North Korea maps reveals how a corporate lens can limit the advocacy of 
digital maps. The citizen cartographer is not a free and unfettered agent of change, but one 
beholden to the visual frames of corporations like Google. Resolution is never value free, even 
though users may feel like they are getting an unvarnished view from above.73  
In early January of 2013, a host of news outlets reported that Google chairman Eric 
Schmidt was traveling to North Korea on a kind of tour with former New Mexico governor Bill 
Richardson, along with a small entourage.74 The travelers were quick to point out that this 
summit was not sponsored by Google, the government, or any other public entity, and was 
labeled instead a “private, humanitarian mission.”75 As Richardson emphatically told the 
Associated Press, “This is not a Google trip, but I’m sure [Eric Schmidt is] interested in some of 
the economic issues there, the social media aspect. So this is why we are teamed up on this.”76 
Richardson, in particular, was aiming to discuss the detainment of a U.S. citizen jailed in 
Pyongyang, while Schmidt aimed to talk about Internet connectivity and openness and possibly 
make a donation. Very quickly, however, the visit became controversial, with sharp criticisms 
from the U.S. State Department that the timing of the trip was spectacularly unhelpful, given that 
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right before Christmas of 2012, North Korea fired a satellite into space using a long-range 
rocket, which Washington condemned as the signs of ballistic missile technology testing.77  
 As Schmidt said shortly after the trip, in an effort to explain the purpose of his visit, 
North Korea “is the last really closed country in the world….This is a country that has suffered 
from lack of information. The Internet was built for everyone, including North Koreans. The 
quickest way to get economic growth in North Korea is to open up the Internet. I did my best to 
tell them this.”78 Schmidt’s brand of cross-border techno-utopianism was at odds with the 
bordered, nation-centric concerns of the State Department. Schmidt’s mission and Washington’s 
very public rebuke indicates the unique rhetorical tensions between national security, 
international humanitarianism, and corporate affairs, and offers a profound comment on the issue 
of sovereignty in a global landscape of interactive software and Big Data.  
 It was around the time of Schmidt’s trip that Joshua Stanton and Curtis Melvin were 
releasing their most sophisticated maps yet of the North Korean camps.79 These events made for 
a stark contrast: Schmidt, the face of Google, makes humanitarian overtures to a repressive state, 
while at the same time his massive software apparatus indicts the actions of that state through the 
application of its data onto latitude and longitude. Schmidt’s own technologies were being used 
to violate the bordered sovereignty of North Korea and expose an underbelly of human rights 
abuses, even as he traveled to make economic inroads for his company. Complicating this release 
of a new set of camp maps by groups drawing on Google’s data was Google’s own attempt to 
claim a sense of ownership of this cartographic process. For example, on January 28, 2013, 
Jayanth Mysore, a Senior Product Manager for Google Map Maker, accompanied an official 
release by Google of new maps of North Korea with a statement encouraging the kind of crowd-
sourcing cartography that produced these Korean maps, but of course, all under the umbrella of 
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the Google imprint.80 As Mysore reminded readers using a narrative of resolution, “The goal of 
Google Maps is to provide people with the most comprehensive, accurate, and easy-to-use 
modern map of the world. As part of this mission, we’re constantly working to add more detailed 
map data in areas that traditionally have been mostly blank. For a long time, one of the largest 
places with limited map data has been North Korea. But today we are changing that with the 
addition of more detailed maps of North Korea in Google Maps….Since 2008, Google Map 
Maker has enabled anyone with an interest in cartography to update the maps of the areas they 
know, and improve their level of detail and accuracy….Creating maps is a crucial first step 
towards helping people access more information about parts of the world that are unfamiliar with 
them.”81 Mysore labeled the collection of contributors to Google Map Maker’s North Korea 
Project as “citizen cartographers,” which seemingly has different connotations when used by 
Google itself. Here, Google becomes the organizer and also main protagonist in a compelling 
narrative of resolute progress with a focus on a consistent and constant increase of knowledge, 
awareness, but also through the citizen cartography label, inclusion, while also trying to reclaim 
a modicum of authority in the race to map North Korea.  
More than a few researchers have commented on the fact that Google Earth and Google 
Maps simulate a community of collaboration and mobility inside the logic of a competitive, 
hegemonic corporation.82 As Lindsay Palmer points out, Google “encourages various companies 
and organizations to draw upon its mapping interface in order to create mashups that allow for 
more specific and often more subversive attempts at geospatial visualization. Google uses this 
service to cultivate an ethos of collaboration, suggesting that its status as a private corporation 
comes second to providing useful tools to a global public.”83 Part of this ethos is the rhetoric of 
network power, or in Sangeet Kumar’s terms “an amorphous web of treaties, organizations and 
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institutions, which functions by presenting its private interest as a global one.”84 The best 
interests of the globe are conflated with Google’s own private interest in the free flow of 
information. Such a conflation is also predicated on a kind of placelessness inherent in network 
power, for Kumar: “a web where, in principle, each node has as much control as another. This 
architecture also entitles [Google] to claim that they represent the global good, as opposed to the 
parochial interests of a particular location, since all points on the network could equally use it to 
its advantage.”85 To operate from “no place” is to be able to claim that one is above interests. In 
the process, Google is able to fashion its citizen-viewers as data-driven technocratic 
humanitarians, with the right resolution to enact change. 
All of this becomes a strange kind of balancing act, of course, for Google, and raises 
important questions around cartographic expertise. In a critique by National Geographic shortly 
after Google’s release of their North Korea maps, the magazine’s Director of Research Juan Jose 
Valdes wrote that “While the democratization of mapmaking has much to add to an old science 
by allowing anyone with access to a computer to upload their findings, it’s also important that 
we acknowledge the pitfalls and limits of citizen cartography….It’s one thing to record and 
portray place-names on a map as recognized by locals or wondering citizen cartographers. It’s 
quite another for them to abide by the official cartographic policies of the territories they are 
mapping.…In many places, little can be achieved without the approval of local and or national 
authorities—especially in North Korea.”86 Elsewhere in the op-ed, Valdes notes National 
Geographic’s own role as a contrast, as he writes, “When attempting to map contentious areas, 
National Geographic not only works closely with individual governmental entities but also with 
external entities, including international toponymic (place-naming) authorities and agencies such 
as the United Nations.” Valdes also importantly reveals a still-powerful perspective around 
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cartography as he adds, “From National Geographic’s perspective, all a map should accomplish 
is the actual portrayal of national sovereignty, as it currently exists….To do otherwise would 
give map readers an unrealistic picture of what is occurring on the ground.”87 Of course, 
National Geographic’s charges against citizen cartography could be chalked up to a tacit 
acknowledgment that its more traditional approaches are becoming obsolete, but nevertheless, 
these exchanges speak to a wider issue about the story cartography not only tells the world but 
the story it tells itself. Here, a conglomerate like National Geographic is drawing on a history of 
cartography disciplining and consolidating power, alongside mapping’s cult of objectivity and 
expectations of faithful representation. Valdes wonders aloud about the very nature of 
cartographic collaboration and its rapprochement between state power, academic science, and 
public opinion. 
 The National Geographic’s response to Google indicates an open debate on the question 
of how much this citizen-cartography, as exemplified in the North Korean camp controversy, is a 
corporate-controlled narrative, how much of it is determined by state-sanctioned knowledge, 
how much of it is controlled by both software and cartographic experts choosing what it is we 
see and how we see it, or how much of it truly is in the creative hands of activists on a 
transnational level. The freedom of the user to “see” is bound up in a negotiation between the 
humanitarian citizen and the software itself, leaving an open question around just how much 
Google has democratized expertise. If the state controlled the resolution of maps during the Cold 
War, now it seems the corporation controls the resolution of maps today. That shift is an 
important one to mark: as citizen cartographers have seeming freedom to “invade” North Korea 
through software, the state still largely controls the ability to act on North Korean transgressions 
(through sanctions and weapons), even as these state actors are using the ocular, high-resolution 
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tools of a profit-seeking corporation. This heady mix of citizenship, state sovereignty, and 
corporate surveillance is now a hallmark of twenty-first century vision and directs the narratives 
of resolution today. 
Conclusion 
On August 8, 2017, President Trump told reporters gathered at a golf club in New Jersey 
that “North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with 
fire and fury like the world has never seen.”88 The Atlantic’s coverage of Trump’s response came 
equipped with the now-requisite satellite map imagery with yellow arrows and labels indicating a 
uranium enrichment facility.89 Without any reference to it in the ensuing article, the visual of the 
nuclear structure stands on its own. That is the power of satellite mapping—an ability to be read 
as “truth-telling” with little context. With the escalation of hostilities between the two countries 
reaching ever upward, interrogating the ways in which we envision North Korea has become 
more important than ever before. Certainly the language of presidents helps direct our vision of 
North Korea, but as this essay has demonstrated, we must account for the variety of discourses 
that the geographic imagination of the area has produced—including the satellite images 
accompanying such language that are now ubiquitous and often go unquestioned. North Korea is 
a multilayered rhetorical construct, both a real site and a complex set of sights—we often 
experience a site like North Korea through the sight of its clandestine camps, outlined through 
the resolution of pixels on desktop interfaces, and that kind of experience has its consequence.90 
One question left unanswered thus far is how this tendency toward resolution affects 
actual U.S. geopolitical relations with North Korea on the ground. Geopolitics, since the early 
20th century, has been a pseudo-science of surfaces—the world is a mapped gameboard, where 
strategic interests can be reduced and simplified into discrete ideologies, and those spaces on the 
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map become open containers. Areas like North Korea have traditionally served as surfaces to be 
filled in by the knowledges produced through Western surveillance and intervention. Today, 
those producing such knowledges may look a little different than the scientists and policymakers 
of old, but they are still serving similar abstract purposes. In a sense, the endgame, as during the 
Cold War, where the U.S tried to place its knowledge of the Soviet Union on the map, is to 
impress makers and viewers alike with the knowledge that “we know what you’re doing—over 
there.” Beyond that, the goals are fuzzier. In other words, what to do with that knowledge is less 
clear, and while the citizen gains a certain agency from their power over the geospatial software, 
they still operate within corporate and state rhetorics. Maps are always constrained by their 
histories of state power, as much as they can argue for social change. 
More specifically, reaching back to Senator Brownback’s invitations for his colleagues 
and in turn the American people to see and witness North Korean transgressions against 
international standards of conduct, we are faced with the legacy of twin histories of militarism 
and humanitarianism in viewing the region, of which Trump is now a part. Prison camps are just 
one constituent part of what emerges in the digital translation process as “North Korea.”  The 
history of modern humanitarianism has continually been bound up with concerns around national 
security—to provide aid, to offer technical assistance and resources, and to defend human rights 
in so-called developing nations has most often been argued in the interest not just of altruism but 
of protecting security and democratic ideologies.91 Satellite maps by citizen cartographers of 
North Korea cannot escape this history. To get a clearer vantage point of North Korea through a 
humanitarian lens is also to look through a militarized lens. Let us not ignore the fact that the 
same geospatial technology used to track labor camps is used to track nuclear sites—all are 
smoothed out into the same bird’s eye viewpoint and abstracted into ideology.  
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Based on these contexts, it is important to remember the tensions between the form of the 
satellite map (and its history of being used as both state weapon and activist document) and the 
actual content. According to Andrew Herscher, “If the manifest content of a satellite image was a 
scene of the surveilled world, then its latent content was the power of the surveillance state to 
produce this scene in the first place.”92 This remains true, but the notion of a surveillance state 
simply packaging images for consumption is complicated by the advent of citizen cartographers. 
Citizen cartography defies traditional notions of cartographic expertise, while still reinforcing 
particular ideologies of security and statism. Even though citizen cartographers have done the 
translating of raw photos into maps, we are still in a paradigm where we expect our leaders to 
take that information and act on our behalf; the Brownbacks of the world are still who we look to 
in order to challenge human rights abuses. Thus, we remain transfixed by the power of geospatial 
technologies, but still hamstrung by the very real issues of geopolitical sovereignty. We are 
bound to what corporations and the state are willing to show us, and yet we have more 
knowledge, and more ability to acquire that knowledge on our own, than ever before. The 
character of that knowledge needs more critique by interdisciplinary scholars. We are often 
simply completing narratives of resolution, where the digital interface continues to promise that 
we will more clearly see the problems, and thus more definitively resolve them. The telos of the 
North Korean camp mapping is important to consider, as we have to consider if somehow we 
will eventually be able to see bodies in the maps and photographs, and how that will change (or 
not change) our sense of vision. And of course, we are left with the question whether clearer 
resolution and even greater knowledge will bring relief to the prisoners being surveilled. 
The problem that the rhetoric of resolution creates is that it is always never-ending: we 
are continually searching for a better, clearer view, one that is never quite resolved. Citizen 
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cartographers work within screens, and when they click to zoom in and get a better view, they 
end up in another screen—closer to the action, but still a screen nonetheless. North Korea is 
always a simulation, a clean rendering of a much more complicated scene below. Some scholars 
have bemoaned the dangers of the loss of expertise that comes with citizen cartography, but I 
would argue that it is beside the point (and should be in fact, welcome anyway).93 Instead, the 
dangers are in comforting ourselves as citizens that these technologies provide some new kind of 
unfettered access to the truth, to a clear view. That view has a long and complex history, as this 
essay has pointed out, not a clean progressive narrative. Kaplan’s work is once again relevant, 
specifically, to the inquiry around historical narratives of resolution, reminding us that  
a stable view, made incrementally and more precisely legible through progressive 
technical innovation, can be read against the grain to remind us that a visual culture is 
always in the process of being pulled together even as it never quite holds true. Satellite 
imagery and digital computing push this reminder uncomfortably closer to the front of 
any inquiring mind. What can be ‘seen’ moves quickly into different questions entirely 
once the body becomes further displaced by mechanical processes.94  
The displacement of both the surveillant Western body and the North Korean body in these maps 
removes a flesh-and-blood aspect to citizenship on both sides. We think we have control over a 
stable view, but that sense of stability may be illusory. Meanwhile, the camp remains ever-




[Fig. 1. Joshua Stanton, “Camp 22,” One Free Korea, Blog, http://freekorea.us/camps/22-
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